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Abstract
We uncover the complete ordinal implications of supermodularity on finite
lattices under the assumption of weak monotonicity. In this environment,
we show that supermodularity is ordinally equivalent to the notion of qua-
sisupermodularity introduced by Milgrom and Shannon. We conclude that
supermodularity is a weak property, in the sense that many preferences have
a supermodular representation.




Economists have long regarded supermodularity as the formal expression of
complementarity in preference; according to Samuelson [20], the use of su-
permodularity as a notion of complementarities dates back to Fisher, Pareto
and Edgeworth. In this paper, we characterize those weakly monotonic pref-
erences on finite consumption sets that have a supermodular utility represen-
tation. We show that, in many ordinal economic models, supermodularity
is a very weak assumption which is not testable with data on consumption
expenditures.
Supermodularity is a cardinal property of a function defined on a lattice.
It roughly states that a function has “increasing differences.” For this rea-
son, it is usually interpreted as modeling complementarities. For example,
consider a consumer with a utility function over two goods. A seemingly
natural notion of complementarity is that the two goods are complementary
if the marginal utility of consuming one of the goods is increasing in the con-
sumption of the other; for smooth functions, if the cross-partial derivatives
are non-negative.
Because it is a cardinal property, a number of authors, including Allen
[2], Hicks and Allen [10], Samuelson [20], and Stigler [23], rejected supermod-
ularity as a notion of complementarities. They thought that, because it is
not an ordinal notion, it would have no testable implications. While these
authors were essentially right, their argument was incomplete. Their argu-
ment ran as follows: A supermodular function has positive cross-derivatives.
Fix any given point. We may take an ordinal transformation of the function,
preserving the preferences it represents, such that some cross-derivatives at
this point become negative. While this is correct, it only demonstrates the
lack of testable implications of supermodularity as a local property.1 Super-
modularity at any given point (in the form of nonnegative cross-derivatives)
is not refutable. They believed that, as a consequence, supermodularity has
no global ordinal or behavioral implications. In an influential and impor-
1Samuelson [21] apparently understood this point as well (see p. 1271).
tant paper, Milgrom and Shannon [16] introduced quasisupermodularity, an
ordinal implication of supermodularity. Any supermodular function gener-
ates a quasisupermodular order structure, proving that supermodularity has
ordinal content.
Our main result characterizes the ordinal content of supermodularity un-
der the additional assumptions of weak monotonicity and finiteness. Under
these additional assumptions, it is equivalent to the more general notion of
quasisupermodularity. We conclude that supermodularity can only have em-
pirical implications in addition to quasisupermodularity if preferences are
not weakly monotonic, or if an infinite number of preferences between ob-
jects can be observed. In addition, as all strictly monotonic preferences are
quasisupermodular, we conclude that for strictly monotonic preferences, one
cannot refute the hypothesis that a utility function is supermodular with a
finite number of observations.
A primary implication of our results is that supermodularity is not testable
with data on consumption expenditures. Thus, we rigorously confirm the in-
tuition of Samuelson, Hicks, Allen and Stigler. We use a model related to
Afriat’s [1], which shows that concavity is not testable with a finite collec-
tion of consumption data. We show that, in our model, any data which are
generated by the preference maximization of a rational individual can also
be generated by the maximization of a supermodular utility function.2
An additional application of our model is to the refutation of the ambiguity-
aversion concept in the Choquet expected utility model, introduced by Schmei-
dler [22]. We find that, if we may only observe the amount of money that
an individual would trade for a bet on a given event, and if this amount is
monotonic with respect to set inclusion, then we cannot refute the hypothesis
of ambiguity aversion.
Our results do not imply that supermodularity is a vacuous concept in
economic theory. Supermodularity has proved a useful assumption in very
different areas of economics. But the environments in which supermodular-
2Our model is different than Afriat’s only in that we require consumption space to be
finite. This seems a reasonable assumption if goods come in discrete units, for example.
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ity is useful are either cardinal, such as convex transferable-utility games, or
violate monotonicity, such as applications to games of strategic complemen-
tarities.
Under our maintained assumptions of finiteness and weak monotonicity,
supermodularity has additional ordinal implications if imposed jointly with
other conditions. Chipman [7] showed that a differentiable, strongly concave
and supermodular utility implies a normal demand. Quah [17] shows that a
concave and supermodular utility implies a class of monotone comparative
statics; among other results, Quah generalizes Chipman’s theorem.
We end with a note on the related literature. The seminal papers on
supermodularity and lattice programming in economics are Topkis [24], Vives
[25], Milgrom and Roberts [15] and Milgrom and Shannon [16]. The closest
papers to ours are Kreps [12] and Li Calzi [13]. Kreps proves a theorem that
one can show is equivalent to our result (see Chambers and Echenique [5]),
but for the special case of a lattice of subsets. Li Calzi describes a class
of functions which are strictly increasing transformations of supermodular
functions. He is also the first to note a connection between monotonicity
and supermodularity.
2 Definitions
Let X be a set and R be a binary relation on X. We define xPRy if xRy is
true and yRx is false. A representation of R is a function u : X → R for
which i) for all x, y ∈ X, if xRy, then u (x) ≥ u (y), and ii) for all x, y ∈ X,
if xPRy, then u (x) > u (y).
A partial order on X is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary
relation on X. A partially-ordered set is a pair (X,) where X is a set
and  is a partial order on X. A lattice is a partially-ordered set (X,)
such that for all x, y ∈ X, there exists a unique greatest lower bound x ∧ y
and a unique least upper bound x ∨ y according to . We write x ≺ y if
x  y and x 6= y. We write x ‖ y if neither x  y or y  x. If (X,) is a
lattice, we say a subset S of X is larger than a subset S ′ in the strong set
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order if, for all x ∈ S and all y ∈ S ′, x ∨ y ∈ S and x ∧ y ∈ S ′. We also use
the notation ∂S = {x ∈ S : (∀y ∈ X)(x ≺ y ⇒ y /∈ S)} for the order top
boundary of S.
Say that a function u : X → R is weakly increasing if for all x, y ∈ X,
x  y implies u (x) ≤ u (y). It is strongly increasing if for all x, y ∈ X,
x  y and x 6= y imply u (x) < u (y). Say it is weakly decreasing if for
all x, y ∈ X, x  y implies u (y) ≤ u (x). It is weakly monotonic if it is
either weakly increasing or weakly decreasing.
A function u : X → R is quasisupermodular if, for all x, y ∈ X,
u (x) ≥ u (x ∧ y) implies u (x ∨ y) ≥ u (y) and u (x) > u (x ∧ y) implies
u (x ∨ y) > u (y). A function u : X → R is supermodular if, for all
x, y ∈ X, u (x ∨ y) + u (x ∧ y) ≥ u (x) + u (y).
3 Supermodular Representation
We discuss conditions under which R has a supermodular representation. We
first present the equivalence of supermodularity and quasisupermodularity
for weakly monotonic functions on finite lattices.
Let (X,) be a finite lattice. Our primary result is the following.3,4
Theorem 1 A binary relation on X has a weakly increasing and quasisu-
permodular representation if and only if it has a weakly increasing and su-
permodular representation.
Proof. Any weakly increasing and supermodular representation is also
weakly increasing and quasisupermodular. Thus, suppose that u : X → R
is a weakly increasing and quasisupermodular representation. We will show
that there exists some f : u (X) → R which is strictly increasing, for which
3Our original proof of this result was significantly longer and non-constructive. It relied
on an integer version of the Theorem of the Alternative. The present proof follows the
suggestions of John Quah and Eran Shmaya.
4The theorem can be slightly generalized to the case in which (X,) is an arbitrary
lattice and the binary relation under consideration has a finite number of equivalence
classes. We thank Eran Shmaya for this observation.
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f ◦u is supermodular. As X is finite, u (X) is also finite. Label the elements
of u (X) as {u1, ..., uN}, where u1 < u2 < ... < uN . Define f : u (X) →
R as f (uj) ≡ 2j−1. Note that f ◦ u is weakly increasing. Moreover, it
is also quasisupermodular. Label g ≡ f ◦ u. We will establish that g is
supermodular. To this end, let x, y ∈ X. If x  y or y  x, then it is
obvious that g (x) + g (y) ≤ g (x ∧ y) + g (x ∨ y). Thus, suppose that x ‖ y.
By monotonicity, we know that g(x) ≤ g(x ∨ y) and g(y) ≤ g(x ∨ y). We
claim that we may without loss of generality assume that these inequalities
are strict. To see this, suppose that g(x) = g(x ∨ y). By monotonicity,
g(y) ≥ g(x ∧ y). By quasisupermodularity, g(y) = g(x ∧ y). Consequently,
g(x) + g(y) = g(x ∨ y) + g(x ∧ y). The proof for the case g(y) = g(x ∨ y) is
symmetric.
Hence, g(x) < g(x ∨ y) and g(y) < g(x ∨ y). Let k ∈ {1, ..., N} be such
that u (x ∨ y) = uk. Then u (x) ≤ uk−1 and u(y) ≤ uk−1. Hence
g (x ∨ y) + g (x ∧ y) ≥ 2k−1 = 2k−2 + 2k−2 ≥ g (x) + g (y) .
Hence g is supermodular.
Remark 2 In Theorem 1, the term “weakly increasing” can be replaced by
“weakly decreasing” (this is the version shown by Kreps [12] for the case
of a lattice of subsets). The argument is as follows. Suppose that u is a
weakly decreasing and quasisupermodular function on the lattice (X,). For
all x, y ∈ X, define x ′ y if y  x. Then (X,′) is also a lattice; moreover,
x (∧′) y = x ∨ y and x (∨′) y = x ∧ y. Further, u is weakly increasing on
(X,′). We show that u is also quasisupermodular on (X,′). To see this,
note that u (x) ≥ u (x (∧′) y) implies u (x) ≥ u (x ∨ y). Therefore, as u is
quasisupermodular on (X,), it follows that u (x ∧ y) ≥ u (y) (otherwise, if
u (y) > u (x ∧ y), quasisupermodularity would imply that u (x ∨ y) > u (x)).
Hence u (x (∨′) y) ≥ u (y). If u (x) > u (x (∧′) y), then u (x) > u (x ∨ y).
By quasisupermodularity of u on (X,), this implies that u (x ∧ y) > u (y)
(otherwise, if u (y) ≥ u (x ∧ y), then by quasisupermodularity u (x ∨ y) ≥
u (x)). Hence u (x (∨′) y) > u (y). Thus u is quasisupermodular on (X,′).
5
Hence, there exists a strictly increasing f : u (X) → R such that f ◦ u is
supermodular on (X,′). By the supermodularity of f ◦ u on (X,′), for
all x, y ∈ x, (f ◦ u) (x) + (f ◦ u) (y) ≤ (f ◦ u) (x (∧′) y) + (f ◦ u) (x (∨′) y) =
(f ◦ u) (x ∧ y) + (f ◦ u) (x ∨ y), establishing the supermodularity of f ◦ u on
(X,).
Li Calzi [13] provides a related result whose proof also relies on the com-
position of a function with an exponential function.
The following examples demonstrate that the equivalence described in
the theorem may fail to hold under weaker conditions.
To see that weak monotonicity alone is not sufficient for supermodularity,
consider the following example.
Example 3 Let X = {1, 2}2 with the usual ordering. Let R be representable
by the function u : X → R for which u ((1, 1)) = 0, and u ((1, 2)) =
u ((2, 1)) = u ((2, 2)) = 1. Note that R cannot be represented by a super-
modular function (any such function v would require v ((1, 2)) = v ((2, 1)) =
v ((2, 2)) > v ((1, 1)), so that v ((1, 1)) + v ((2, 2)) < v ((2, 1)) + v ((1, 2)).
Nevertheless, R is weakly monotonic. R cannot be represented by a quasisu-
permodular function, as u ((1, 2)) > u ((1, 1)), yet u ((2, 1)) ≥ u ((2, 2)).
To see that monotonicity is not necessary for a supermodular representa-
tion, consider the following example.
Example 4 Let X = {1, 2}2 with the usual ordering. Let R be representable
by the function u : X → R for which u ((1, 1)) = 0, u ((1, 2)) = −1,
u ((2, 1)) = 2, and u ((2, 2)) = 1.5. Note that u is (strictly) supermodular.
However, note that R is not monotonic.
The preceding discussion suggests one may want to find all binary rela-
tions with a supermodular representation. We present the somewhat com-
plicated answer as Theorem 11 in the appendix.
6
3.1 Strong Monotonicity, Monotone Comparative Stat-
ics and Supermodularity
Theorem 1 has an important immediate corollary. The corollary follows
because any strongly increasing function is quasisupermodular.
Corollary 5 Let (X,) be a finite lattice. If a binary relation has a strongly
increasing representation, then it has a supermodular representation.
Proof. Let R be a binary relation with a strongly increasing representation
u. We claim that u is quasisupermodular. Let x, y ∈ X. First, x  x ∧ y
and x ∨ y  y, so u (x) ≥ u (x ∧ y) and u (x ∨ y) ≥ u (y) hold. Second, if
u (x) > u (x ∧ y), then x  x ∧ y and x 6= x ∧ y. Hence, x ∨ y  y, and
x 6= x ∧ y implies x ∨ y 6= y, so u (x ∨ y) > u (y). By Theorem 1, R has a
supermodular representation.
Corollary 5 states that any consumer with strongly monotonic prefer-
ences can be viewed as maximizing a supermodular utility function. This
observation implies that supermodularity, the property of utility which has
traditionally been viewed as implying that goods are complementary, is vac-
uous in a strongly monotonic environment.
As shown by Milgrom and Shannon [16], quasisupermodular functions
are the only objective functions whose comparative statics are monotone for
all monotone changes in the constraint set. A combination of Theorem 1
with their results leads to an alternative characterization of supermodular
functions. We present some definitions and then reinterpret Milgrom and
Shannon’s monotonicity theorem as our Corollary 6.
Let u : X → R. Define the correspondence Mu : 2X\∅ ⇒ 2X\∅ as
Mu(S) = {x ∈ S : u(y) ≤ u(x) for all y ∈ S}. Say that Mu exhibits non-
satiation if for all S, ∂S ∩Mu(S) 6= ∅. Say that Mu is weakly increasing if
Mu(S) is smaller than Mu(S ′) in the strong set order whenever S is smaller
than S ′ in the strong set order.
Corollary 6 There exists a strictly increasing f : R → R such that the
function f ◦ u : X → R is weakly increasing and supermodular if and only if
Mu is weakly increasing and exhibits non-satiation.
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The proof of Corollary 6 is immediate fromMilgrom and Shannon’s Mono-
tonicity Theorem (Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon [16]) and our Theo-
rem 1.
4 Application 1: Non-Refutability with Con-
sumption Data
Afriat [1] studies data on consumption choices at different prices. He shows
that data can arise from a rational consumer if and only if one can model the
consumer using a concave utility function. Concavity of utility is thus not
refutable with data on consumption choices. Assuming a finite consumption
space, we show that data can arise from a rational consumer if and only if
one can model the consumer using a supermodular utility.
Let X ⊆ Rn+ be a finite lattice. For all k = 1, ..., K, let Sk ∈ 2X\ {∅}
and let xk ∈ Sk. A pair (xk, Sk) is a consumption bundle xk demanded
by a consumer when the feasible set is Sk. This is a natural framework in
which to investigate the empirical content of supermodularity in consumer
theory. The model is close to Matzkin’s [14] and Forges and Minelli’s [9]
generalization of Afriat’s model.
We assume data satisfy the following three conditions. The first is a
classical “non-satiation” assumption. The second is a “free disposability”
assumption. The last requirement is a variant of the weak axiom of revealed
preference. It ensures that the revealed-preference relation is asymmetric.5
1. For all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, xk ∈ ∂Sk.
2. For all k ∈ {1, ..., K}, if x ∈ Sk and y ≤ x then y ∈ Sk.
3. For all k, k′ ∈ {1, ..., K}, if xk′ ∈ Sk and xk′ 6= xk, then xk /∈ Sk′ .
5Since we are studying the issue of rationalizability, assuming the weak axiom is vacuous
because it is necessary for the existence of a rationalization. We make the assumption for
expositional reasons, to work with the same notion of strict preference as in the rest of
the paper.
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Define R on X by xRy if there exists k ∈ {1, ..., K} such that x = xk and
y ∈ Sk. Note that R is the standard revealed-preference relation. By 3, for
all x, y ∈ X, if xRy and x 6= y, then xPRy.
Say that u : X → R rationalizes the data {(xk, Sk)}K
k=1
if it represents
R. In other words, u rationalizes the data if a consumer maximizing utility
u in Sk chooses xk. The function u is called a rationalization of the data.










is rationalizable if and only if it is rationalized by a supermodular function.
Proof. We write xRy for (x, y) ∈ R and xRτy if there is a sequence
x = x1, x2, . . . , xK = y
with K > 1 and xkRxk+1, for k = 1, . . . K − 1. Let B be the binary relation
defined as xBy if xRy or x ≥ y. It is easily verified that xPBy if xPRy or
x > y.
To prove the proposition, we establish that R has a supermodular rep-
resentation. First, we show that any representation of B is also a represen-
tation of R. Second, we show that if R has a representation, then B has a





is rationalizable, B has a
representation. Any representation of B is strongly monotone and is also a
representation of R. Corollary 5 then implies the existence of a supermodular
rationalization.
We show that any representation of B is also a representation of R: let u
represent B. First let xRy. Then xBy, and hence u (x) ≥ u (y). Second, let
xPRy. Then xBy; we prove that in fact xPBy. If yBx, then y ≥ x or yRx,
but the latter would violate Property (3) of the data. Hence yBx implies
y ≥ x. But as xPRy, x 6= y, hence y > x. Hence there exists k ∈ {1, ..., K}
for which x = xk and y ∈ Sk. But this implies that xk /∈ ∂Sk, a contradiction
of Property (1). Hence xPBy and thus u (x) > u (y).
We now reproduce, as Lemma 8 and without proof, the standard result
on when R has a representation (see e.g. Richter [18]).
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Lemma 8 There is a representation of R if and only if xRτy implies that
yPRx is false.
We show that, if R has a representation, then so does B. Suppose that B
has no representation. Then there exist x, y ∈ X for which xBτy and yPBx.
Suppose that x ≥ y. Then yPBx implies that there exists k for which y = xk.
But y ∈ ∂Sk, so x ≥ y implies x = y, contradicting the fact that yPBx.
Therefore, x  y. Hence, xBτy implies that there exists {x1, . . . xL} ⊆ X for
which xBx1B . . . BxLBy, where at least one B corresponds to R and not ≥.
We claim that there exists x′ 6= y for which x ≥ x′ and x′Rτy. To
see this, note that for any collection of data {z1, ..., zm} ⊆ X for which
z1Rz2 ≥ z3 ≥ ... ≥ zm, it follows by the fact that z2 ≥ zm and Property 2 of
the data that z1Rzm. From this fact, we establish that there is x
′ 6= y with
x ≥ x′ and x′Rτy.
As yPBx, either yPRx or y > x. If yPRx, then yPRx
′ by x ≥ x′ and
Properties 1 and 2 of the data. In this case, we may conclude by Lemma 8
that R has no representation. If instead y > x, then we have x′Rτy and
y > x′. Then, x′Ry contradicts Property 1 of the data, so there exists
x′′ ∈ X, x′′ 6= x′ for which x′Rτx′′Ry. Now, y ≥ x′ and Property 2 of the
data imply that x′′Rx′. In fact, by Property 3 and x′′ 6= x′, x′′PRx′. So
Lemma 8 implies that R does not have a representation.
Our model is related to Afriat’s in the following way. Afriat assumes that




for which xk ∈ X ⊆ Rn+ and pk ∈ Rn++, for all k. Each pair is
an observed consumption choice xk at prices pk. Afriat’s data obtains when
Sk =
{
x : pk · x ≤ pk · xk} .
Assuming Property (3) simplifies the exposition by allowing us to equate
rationalizability with representation. Property (3) implies that a represen-
tation of R satisfies u(xk) > u(y) for all y ∈ Sk \ {xk}. If we do not assume
Property 3, a statement relating rationalizability with a supermodular ra-
tionalization, like in Proposition 7, still holds. We would need to define
rationalization as above; as a utility having as xk its unique maximum in Sk.
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Our model allows us to accommodate non-linear budgets sets. Forges and
Minelli [9] investigate a similar model of non-linear budget sets, and estab-
lish that concavity has stronger implications than rationality alone. Thus
the non-refutability of supermodularity is more robust than that of concav-
ity, since it continues to hold with general budget sets. Matzkin [14] first
discussed non-linear budget sets to incorporate situations where consumers
have monopsony power, or where the consumer is a social planner facing an
economy’s production possibility set.
Two remarks are in order. First, under an additional restriction on
Afriat’s data, rationalizability implies that there is a smooth, strongly mono-
tonic rationalization [6]. Corollary 20 in Li Calzi [13] then implies the ex-
istence of a supermodular rationalization. So one can use existing results
to prove a version of Proposition 7 for the Afriat data under Chiappori and
Rochet’s assumptions.
The second remark refers to concave rationalizations. Afriat shows that
data are rationalizable if and only if they are rationalizable by a concave
utility. Proposition 7 says that data are rationalizable if and only if they
are rationalizable by a supermodular utility. One might conjecture that any
rationalizable data con be rationalized by a function that is both concave and
supermodular. This turns out to be false. Supermodularity and concavity
jointly imply that demand is normal. So, while concavity and supermodular-
ity have no testable implications as individual assumptions, they are refutable
as joint assumptions.
That supermodularity and concavity imply normal demand is shown in
Quah [17]; the earlier result of Chipman [7] requires additional smoothness
assumptions on utility. Quah’s result does not apply to functions that are
supermodular on a finite domain. We present a very simple adaptation of
Quah’s argument in Example 9.
Example 9 Consider the data (xk, pk)2k=1, where p
1 = (2, 1.1), x1 = (1, 2),
p2 = (2.1, 1), and x2 = (2, 1). This collection of data is rationalizable (as it
satisfies Afriat’s condition) and thus has both a concave and a supermodular
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rationalization. We show that it has no concave and supermodular rational-
ization.
Let C ⊆ R2 be convex and X ⊆ C be a sublattice such that
{(1, 2), (2, 1), (3/2, 1), (3/2, 2), (2, 2)} ⊆ X.
Suppose that u : C → R is concave and that u|X is supermodular. We shall
prove that u cannot rationalize the data.
We first note that p1 · (3/2, 1) < p1 · (1, 2) so that we need u(3/2, 1) <
u(1, 2) for u to rationalize the data. We then prove that u(2, 1) < u(3/2, 2),
which is inconsistent with u rationalizing the data, as p2 ·(3/2, 2) < p2 ·(2, 1).
Start from u(3/2, 2)− u(2, 1) = u(3/2, 2)− u(2, 2) + u(2, 2)− u(2, 1). Then,
u(3/2, 2)− u(2, 2) = u ((2, 2)− (1/2)(1, 0))− u(2, 2)
≥ u ((2, 2)− (1/2)(1, 0)− (1/2)(1, 0))
−u ((2, 2)− (1/2)(1, 0))
= u(1, 2)− u(3/2, 2);
the inequality above follows from concavity [17]. Supermodularity on X im-
plies that u(2, 2)− u(2, 1) ≥ u(3/2, 2)− u(3/2, 1). Hence,
u(3/2, 2)− u(2, 1) ≥ u(1, 2)− u(3/2, 2) + u(3/2, 2)− u(3/2, 1)
= u(1, 2)− u(3/2, 1).
This implies that u cannot rationalize the data because u(3/2, 1) < u(1, 2)
implies u(2, 1) < u(3/2, 2).
Quah’s result on normal demand is not directly applicable because the do-
main on which u is supermodular is finite, and because prices and expenditure
both change between observations k = 1 and k = 2. However, a straightfor-
ward modification of Quah’s arguments gives the result.
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5 Application 2: Uncertainty aversion and
the Choquet expected utility model.
We now turn to a model of decision under uncertainty where supermodularity
models uncertainty aversion.
An individual faces risk when probabilities are exogenously specified. If
she is not given these probabilities, she faces uncertainty. When the events
are not given probabilities, there is no reason to suspect that the individual
will assign probabilities to them. We study a model introduced by Schmeidler
[22]; in this model, the individual in fact need not assign probabilities to
events, but assigns some measure of likelihood to them. This measure is
called a capacity. Supermodularity of the capacity in this model is interpreted
as uncertainty aversion.
While it is well-known that Schmeidler’s notion of uncertainty aversion
may not place restrictions on betting behavior, we show that the extent to
which this is the case may be greater than previously realized.
We briefly describe Schmeidler’s model and explain the implications of
our results.
Let Ω be a finite set of possible states of the world and let Y be a set of
possible outcomes. The set of [3] acts is the set of functions f : Ω→ ∆(Y ).
Denote the set of acts by F . A capacity is a function ν : 2Ω → R for
which ν (∅) = 0, ν (Ω) = 1, and A ⊆ B implies ν (A) ≤ ν (B). A capacity
is supermodular if it is supermodular when 2Ω is endowed with the set-
inclusion order.
A binary relation R over F conforms to the Choquet expected utility
model if there exists some u : ∆ (Y )→ R conforming to the von Neumann-






u (f (ω)) dν (ω) ; 6 (0)
Schmeidler [22] axiomatizes those R conforming to the Choquet expected
utility model. A binary relation R which conforms to the Choquet expected
utility model exhibits Schmeidler uncertainty aversion if and only if ν
is supermodular.
For a given binary relation R over F conforming to the Choquet expected
utility model, define the likelihood relation R∗ over 2Ω by ER∗F if there exist
x, y ∈ X for which xPRy7 and[
x if ω ∈ E




x if ω ∈ F
y if ω /∈ F
]
.
The likelihood relation reflects a “willingness to bet.” If ER∗F , then the
individual prefers to place stakes on E as opposed to F . For the Choquet
expected utility model, this relation is complete. We will write the asym-
metric part of R∗ by P ∗ and the symmetric part by I∗. The following is an
immediate corollary to Theorem 1, using the fact that all likelihood relations
are weakly increasing.
Proposition 10 Suppose that R conforms to the Choquet expected utility
model. Then the likelihood relation R∗ is incompatible with Schmeidler un-
certainty aversion if and only if there exist events A,B,C ⊆ Ω for which
A ⊆ B and B ∩ C = ∅ for which (A ∪ C)P ∗A and (B ∪ C) I∗B.
6The Choquet integral with respect to ν is defined as:∫
Ω




ν ({ω : g (ω) > t}) dt+
∫ 0
−∞
[ν ({ω : g (ω) > t})− 1] dt
7Here we are abusing notation by identifying a constant act with the value that constant
act takes.
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A A Characterization of Supermodular Rep-
resentation
We obtain a characterization of the relations with a supermodular represen-
tation from an application of the Theorem of the Alternative. Similar results
for concave representations are Richter and Wong [19] and Kannai [11].
Let (X,) be a finite lattice.
Theorem 11 A binary relation R on X has a supermodular representation
if and only if, for all N,K ∈ N, for all {xi}Ni=1 , {yi}Ni=1, {zl}Kl=1, {wl}Kl=1 ⊆ X
for which for all l = 1, ..., K − 1, zlRwl and for which
N∑
i=1










zKPRwK does not hold.
Proof. The existence of a supermodular representation is equivalent to
the existence of a vector u ∈ RX for which i) for all x, y ∈ X for which
x ‖ y, (1x∨y + 1x∧y − 1x − 1y) ·u ≥ 0, and ii) for all x, y ∈ X for which xPRy,
(1x − 1y) · u > 0. By the integer version of the Theorem of the Alternative
[4, 8], such a vector fails to exist if and only if for all x, y ∈ X for which
x ‖ y, there exists some n{x,y} ∈ Z+ and for all x, y ∈ X for which xRy, there
exists some n(x,y) ∈ Z+, and there exists at least one n(x,y) > 0 for which
xPRy, such that∑
{{x,y}:x‖y}
n{x,y} (1x∨y + 1x∧y − 1x − 1y) +
∑
{(x,y):xRy}
n(x,y) (1x − 1y) = 0.
Separating terms, we obtain∑
{{x,y}:x‖y}












It is easy to see that this is equivalent to the existence of N,K ∈ N,
{xi}Ni=1 , {yi}Ni=1, {zl}Kl=1, {wl}Kl=1 ⊆ X such that for all l = 1, ..., K − 1,
zlRwl and for which
N∑
i=1
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